Substation RTU compromise
Industroyer / CrashOverride (2016) and Industroyer2 (2022) targeted substation automation directly. The attack signature was the unauthorized control write — and the consequence was the lights.
MITRE T0827, T0855OT integrity for generation, transmission, and distribution — where every relay, RTU, and grid-control PLC is continuously monitored at Level 0/1 against its own learned behavior, anchored on verified firmware and program integrity.
Industroyer / CrashOverride (2016) and Industroyer2 (2022) targeted substation automation directly. The attack signature was the unauthorized control write — and the consequence was the lights.
MITRE T0827, T0855Unauthorized writes to governor or excitation systems can swing frequency or voltage, stress equipment, and create cascading trips.
Coordinated load manipulation across multiple substations can stress system inertia and trigger protective relays in patterns that look like equipment failure.
Substation RTUs, breaker controls, and generation governors all share a property: an unauthorized write at the controller has the same physical effect regardless of how it arrived (insider, compromised engineering workstation, lateral movement). OTegrity catches the PLC-side outcome.
Self-calibrated baselines per substation — relay timing, breaker operations, transformer telemetry — detect unauthorized control writes within seconds.
Direct-from-controller integrity validation on every monitored relay and RTU. Firmware or program changes are detected and alerted in real time.
A behavioral anomaly during an unauthorized firmware change is automatically classified as a Cyber Attack — distinct from equipment fault or operational stress.
A live walkthrough on a process similar to yours — values, rates, timing, relationships, and classification — and how it fits alongside your existing stack.